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ILLEGITIMACY AND THE RIGHTS OF
UNWED FATHERS IN ADOPTION
PROCEEDINGS AFTER
QUILLOIN V. WALCOTT
In 1968 the Supreme Court began to question the constitutionality of illegitimacy as a legal classification. The Court held
void a state statute which denied illegitimate children a wrongful death action for the death of their mother.1 In a companion
case the Court held that the state could not deny a mother a
wrongful death action for her children merely because they
were illegitimate at the time of death.2 In both cases the Court
felt that there was no justifiable basis for the statutory classifica3
tion, but refused to make illegitimacy a "suspect" classification.
Having addressed illegitimacy in respect to the rights of the
child and the mother it was inevitable that the rights of an unwed father, in regard to his illegitimate children, would be ques1. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
2. Glona v. American Guarantee Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968).
3. E.g., Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976). The Court sustained a
Social Security Act which involved classification based on illegitimacy and
rejected the argument that illegitimacy was a "suspect classification" deserving "strict scrutiny." However, other decisions of the Court have employed a more demanding test than "mere rationality." Although it is
difficult to define a consistent pattern of review, the Court has seemingly
dealt most harshly with those statutes which punish illegitimates to discourage illicit adult relationships. The Court has ruled that to penalize a
child for the wrongs of the parents is unjust and illogical, and that states
cannot attempt to influence the actions of men and women by imposing
sanctions on their illegitimate children. Weber v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co.,
406 U.S. 164, 175-76 (1972).
Prof. Gerald Gunther characterized the more demanding standard of
review as "rationality with bite." This standard falls somewhere between
strict scrutiny and mere rationality and is used in those situations where
dogma prohibits the use of the strict scrutiny standard. The mere rationality standard would not otherwise adequately remedy the inequities resulting from the discrimination alleged. G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 758
(9th ed. 1975). A "strict scrutiny" test would still be applied if the classification infringes a "fundamental interest." The "fundamental interest" strand
of fourteenth amendment equal protection and its application to the parental rights of an unwed father will be examined at various stages of this comment. See notes 25, 36, 42, 84 infra. See generally Comment, Constitutional
Law-The Fatherof an IllegitimateChild: No UnconstitutionalRights in the
Child, 18 How. L.J. 843 (1975) and Comment, The Emerging Constitutional
Protection of the Putitive Father's ParentalRights, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1581
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Putitive Father'sRights].
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tioned.4 The Court first dealt with the rights of an unwed father 5
in Stanley v. Illinois6 and ruled that it was unconstitutional for
Illinois to deprive the unwed father custody of his illegitimate
children without a parental fitness hearing. It is unclear
whether the Stanley decision was based on due process, or on
equal protection grounds of the fourteenth amendment. This
ambiguity was the result of conflicting statements in the holding.
First, relying on the due process clause, the Court struck
down the Illinois law as it related to the parental rights of the
unwed, because it conclusively presumed parental unfitness
from the fact of illegitimacy. 7 Second, relying on the equal protection clause, the Court held that the unwed father was entitled
to the same hearing on the parental fitness question as a legiti-

mate's parent. 8
Because the scope and the grounds of Stanley were open to
speculation, the states differed in their interpretation of, and

compliance with the decision. In particular, it was unclear what
lengths a state was required to go to give notice to unwed fathers; what type of hearing the unwed father was entitled to; and
whether the unwed father is entitled to a veto over an adoption
proceeding. In short, the unresolved question after Stanley was
whether an unwed father is entitled to the same substantive parental rights as the father or mother of a legitimate child.
Seemingly in response to this need for further clarification,
the Supreme Court recently handed down its decision in the
case of Quilloin v. Walcott 9 wherein the parental rights of the
unwed father were discussed in the context of adoption. The
Supreme Court looked to the reality of the relationship between
the unwed father and his illegitimate child. The major premise
of the opinion recognized that any rights the biological parent
could assert would necessarily arise out of an existing family relationship. These rights inure because a de facto family exists,
4. The Court has often recognized that the relation between legitimate
parents and their children is constitutionally protected. E.g., Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231-33 (1972); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-401

(1923).

5. An "unwed father," as used herein, will refer to one who has not
married the mother of his children, nor legitimated the children in an appropriate proceeding. A "parent" will refer to the mother or father of either
a legitimate child or a child who has been legitimized in accordance with a
statutorily prescribed procedure. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 701-14

(1971) (amended 1973).
6. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).

7. Id. at 649.
8. Id. at 658.
9. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
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regardless of the legal definition of "family." Against this background the Court outlined the rights of the unwed father and the
correlative constitutional protections of those rights. With
Walcott at hand, it is now appropriate to reexamine this problem area of constitutional law.
This comment will first define the constitutional rights and
protections of an unwed father in an adoption proceeding. Second, a study of exemplary state responses to Stanley will be undertaken to determine their suitability after Walcott. Finally,
there will be a discussion of ways states can comply with the
constitutional principles of Stanley and Walcott.
STANLEY AND WALCOTT:

A

COMPARATIVE

STUDY

The Analytical Framework
Stanley did not create a new fundamental right entitled to
protection under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 10 Although the ambiguous statements of the holding would seem to contradict this notion, the focus of an analysis
of Stanley should not be on fundamental rights, but on procedural due process and equal protection. The issue is whether the
parental rights of an unwed father can be adequately protected
when he is treated differently from parents of legitimates,
merely because his child is illegitimate. The resolution of this
issue is complicated by the need to look beyond the legal rights
of a parent and consider what is best for the child.
To resolve this sensitive family relations problem it was not
unreasonable for the Supreme Court to reject the traditional
dogmatic approach and require states to extend protection of
existing state law to unwed fathers of illegitimate children when
a de facto family relationship exists between them.'1 This
emerging principle can be better understood through a comparative analysis of Stanley and Walcott.
Stanley v. Illinois: The First Step
The plaintiff, an unwed father, had lived with his illegitimate
children and their mother intermittently for eighteen years. After the mother died, the state of Illinois sought to make the children state wards in a dependency proceeding. 12 The state could
take this action by showing that the child had no surviving "parent." 3 Similar action could have been taken through a neglect
10.
11.
12.
13.

See note 3 supra, and notes 25, 36, 42 & 84 infra.
See note 41 and accompanying text infra.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 701-4 (1977).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-5(1)(a) (1977).
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14
proceeding if the state could show that the "parent" was unfit.
"Parent" was defined as the natural parents of a legitimate child,
the survivor of them, the natural mother of an illegitimate child,
or an adoptive parent.'5 The unwed father was not a "parent."
Therefore, as a matter of law, the child had no surviving parent

and whether the father was fit was irrelevant. 16 Once the state
proved the children illegitimate, Stanley was denied the due

process considerations afforded a statutory parent. Stanley
raised constitutional objections to this procedure. The Illinois
arguments, 17 but the United States
Supreme Court rejected his
18
Supreme Court reversed.
The Court's holding in Stanley has been characterized by
some commentators as imprecise and confusing.' 9 This results,
they say, from the ambiguous manner in which the Court articulated the holding: an initial statement stressing the due process
violation, then, at the conclusion, a second statement emphasizing equal protection.
The initial statement was set out in terms narrowly limited
to the facts of the case and based on a violation of the due process clause. 20 The import of this narrow statement is that the
14. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-5(1)(b) (1977).
15. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 701-14 (1971) (amended 1973).
16. Illinois adoption statutes were structured in a similar way. See
notes 61 & 62 and accompanying text infra. The effect of this statutory arrangement was to conclusively presume that an unwed father was an unfit
parent. The dependency hearing in Stanley proceeded on this presumption.
17. In re Stanley, 45 Ill. 2d 132, 256 N.E.2d 814 (1970). The Illinois court
emphasized that the distinction was rationally related to a statutory purpose: to secure for the child the care and guidance that would serve his
moral, emotional, and physical well-being. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 701-2(1)
(1977).
18. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). Mr. Justice Powell and Mr.
Justice Rehnquist took their places on the bench after oral arguments were
completed and did not participate in the decision.
19. See Freeman, Remodeling Adoption Statutes After Stanley v.
Illinois, 15 J. FAM. L. 385, 399 (1976-1977) [hereinafter referred to as Freeman].
20. 405 U.S. at 649. The Court stated:
We conclude that as a matter of due process of law, Stanley was entitled to a hearing on his fitness as a parent before his children were
taken from him and that, by denying him a hearing and extending it to
all other parents whose custody of their children is challenged, the
State denied Stanley the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment.
That the Court meant this to be controlling is buttressed by subsequent
language which said that the interest protected here was "that of a man in
the children he has sired and raised." Id. at 651. One commentator noted
this quote and suggests the opinion is limited to unwed fathers who have
maintained an ongoing relation with their children by either taking custody
of them or supporting them. Schwartz, Rights of a Father With Regard to
His Illegitimate Child, 36 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 3 (1975). The clearest indication
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holding was restricted to Peter Stanley or parties in his fact situation. This result required Illinois to give a de facto parent the
same procedural rights as parents of legitimates.
In contrast, the sweeping scope of the conclusion, emphasizing equal protection, 21 would give all unwed fathers the same
substantive rights as parents without the constraint of proving
the existence of a family relationship. This holding implies that
parental rights emanate from biological kinship rather than a de
facto family relationship. The class of those protected would include disinterested fathers as well as fathers who are unaware
22
of their fatherhood.
This sweeping interpretation of Stanley gained impetus
when the Supreme Court vacated and remanded Rothstein v.
Lutheran Social Services 23 to be considered in light of Stanley.
In Rothstein, the unwed father sought a hearing in the child's
adoption proceeding, even though he had not lived with or
raised the child. The implication of the remand has been that
the Stanley protections must be provided to all unwed fathers,
24
not just de facto parents like Mr. Stanley.
that the decision

was based on procedural due process grounds is in the

dissent in which Chief Justice Burger and Mr. Justice Blackman objected to
due process being the basis of the decision when it was not raised and decided in the Illinois courts. 405 U.S. at 659-60.
21. 405 U.S. at 658. The Court stated:
We have concluded that all Illinois parents are constitutionally entitled
to a hearing on their fitness before their children are removed from
their custody. It follows that denying such a hearing to Stanley and
those like him while granting it to other Illinois parents is inescapably
contrary to the Equal Protection Clause.
22. Barron, Notice to the Unwed Father and Termination of Parental
Rights: Implementing Stanley v. Illinois, 9 FAM. L.Q. 527, 528 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Barron]. Additional support for this approach came in a footnote which suggests that notice be given to all unwed fathers. 405 U.S. at
657 n.9. This infers that all unwed fathers are entitled to protections afforded Peter Stanley. See also Comment, Protecting the Putitive Father's
Rights After Stanley v. Illinois: Problems in Implementation, 13 J. FAM. L.
115, 125-126 (1973-74).
23. 405 U.S. 1051 (1972). The unwed father in Rothstein never lived with
the child because the child was adopted at birth. Four months after the
adoption, the unwed father petitioned the county court for a hearing in an
attempt to assert his biological status as father. He was denied the hearing.
47 Wis. 2d 420, 178 N.W.2d 56 (1970). When the Wisconsin Supreme Court
reconsidered the case, after remand by the United States Supreme Court, it
held that Rothstein's parental rights could not be terminated without a
hearing to determine his fitness. State ex rel Lewis v. Lutheran Social
Serv., 59 Wis. 1, 207 N.W.2d 826 (1973). After the unwed father was found
unfit in the subsequent hearing, the appeals court affirmed the adoption.
Lewis v. Lutheran Social Serv., 68 Wis. 2d 36, 227 N.W.2d 643 (1975).
24. At least one commentator, citing Minnesota v. Nat'l Tea Co., 309 U.S.
551 (1940), has cautioned against making this inference because the
Supreme Court may only be taking this action so the state court will have
an opportunity to reconsider and clarify the basis on which it ruled. Comment, ConstitutionalLaw--A Dependency Hearing Which Would Deny an
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Even after Rothstein, the two interpretations of the holding
in Stanley remained and it was still unclear how far the
Supreme Court meant to go in prescribing procedural protections for unwed fathers. 25 Also left unresolved was the question
of how far a state must go to provide notice of the hearing to the
unwed father. 26 The recent case of Quilloin v. Walcott 27 resolves some of these questions.
Quilloin v. Walcott: The Next Step
Leon Quilloin had an illegitimate son, Darrell Williams. The
mother never married Mr. Quilloin and never lived with him.
Later, the mother married Randall Walcott and Darrell moved in
and lived with them until litigation commenced. Mr. Quilloin
visited the child on occasion, provided support on an irregular
presents. He did not make
basis and sometimes gave the child
28
any effort to legitimize the child.
Randall Walcott eventually filed a petition to adopt the
child, and obtained the mother's consent. Under Georgia law
only the mother's consent was needed for the adoption of an illegitimate child.29 Quilloin was notified of the petition by the
Unwed FatherCustody of His Child on the Death of Its Mother Without Reference to the Father's Fitness as a Parent is Violative of Due Process and
Equal Protection,4 LoY. CHI. L.J. 176, 187 (1973).
25. There was language in Stanley which suggested the interest which
an unwed father had in his child was "fundamental" and that more than a
rational state interest was needed to justify the infringement. The Stanley
Court said "absent a powerful counterveiling interest," the interest of a father in his child warranted deference and protection. 405 U.S. at 651. However, in the context of the overall opinion, this language may only indicate
that an unwed father's parental interests are to be protected by the requirement of procedural due process and that infringement upon these interests
would not invoke the "compelling interest" test. Putitive Father's Rights,
supra note 3, at 1597. Thus the "fundamental interest" rationale does not
lead to resolution of the central conflict of interpretations of the Stanley
decision.
26. It must be remembered that notice was not an issue in Stanley and
that the Court's remarks on the issue were limited to a footnote. 405 U.S. at
657 n.9. See note 52 infra.
27. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
28. A Georgia father may legitimize his child by marrying the mother
and acknowledging the child as his own, GA. CODE ANN. § 74-101 (Supp.
1977), or by obtaining a court order declaring the child legitimate and capable of inheriting from the father. GA. CODE ANN. § 74-103 (Supp. 1977).
These proceedings are ministerial and do not require proof that the best
interest of the child will be served by the result.
29. GA. CODE ANN. § 74-203 (Supp. 1977). This provision states: "The
mother of an illegitimate child shall be entitled to the possession of the
child, unless the father shall legitimate him as before provided. Being the
only recognized parent, she may exercise all the parental power." GA. CODE
ANN. § 74-403(3) (1973) provided: "Illegitimate children.-If the child be illegitimate, the consent of the mother alone shall suffice." Section 74-403 was
recently amended to omit subsection 3. Section 74-406, Notice to Putitive
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Georgia Department of Human Resources3" and responded31by
petitioning to legitimize the child and object to the adoption. If
the legitimation petition was successful, Quilloin would have
been a "parent" entitled to object to the adoption. 32 Georgia
statutes did not provide for simultaneous hearing on the adoption and legitimation petitions. 33 Nonetheless, the trial court, in
light of Stanley, consolidated the proceedings and afforded Quilloin an extensive hearing on all issues relevant to the adoption
and legitimation petition.
After the hearing the Georgia trial court found that legitimation was not in the "best interest of the child, '34 denied the legitimacy petition and decreed the adoption. The Georgia Supreme
Father, became effective Jan. 1, 1978. Section 74-406(c) now provides for notification of those unwed fathers who are ascertainable. The notice is to
advise the putitive father that he will lose all parental rights unless he files
a petition of legitimation within 30 days. If the father subsequently fails to
prosecute the petition to judgment he will lose his parental rights.
30. GA. CODE ANN. § 74-406(a) (b) (Supp. 1977) which deals with notice
to unwed fathers, became effective Jan. 1, 1978. Subsection (a) provides
that if the identity and location of the unwed father is known and he has not
executed a surrender, he is to be notified by registered or certified mail.
Subsection (b) provides measures to be taken when the identity or location
of an unwed father is unknown. This section states that once a court identifies a father and determines he is entitled to notice, the court "shall enter
an appropriate order designed to afford him such notice." Although not
stated, this grant of discretion would probably include the use of notice by
publication.
31. Quilloin cited Stanley when asserting that the relevant provisions of
the Georgia code were unconstitutional because they denied him parental
rights granted married parents. The operative statute, GA. CODE ANN. § 74403(1) & (2) (1977 Supp.), set forth consent requirements for parents other
than unwed fathers. This statute stated "no adoption shall be permitted
except with written consent of the living parents" or unless the parental
rights have been terminated. An amended version of the statute became
effective Jan. 1, 1978.
32. See note 31 supra.
33. See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. at 250 n.8, 252 n.12, for a discussion
of the procedural considerations involved with concurrent adoption and legitimation petitions and the action which the Georgia legislature took to
revise these procedures. As noted earlier, the legitimation proceeding had
been strictly ministerial. See note 28 supra.
34. "Best interests of the child" is one of the most important factors in
determining the question of child custody. It is a broad and somewhat
indefinite term. To determine what is in the "best interests" the court may
consider the moral fitness of the parties, the home environment, the child's
emotional ties to the parties, the parties' emotional ties to the child, the age,
sex, or health of the child, the desirability of continuing an existing thirdparty relationship, and the preference of the child. See Turner v. Pannick,
540 P.2d 1051, 1054 (Alaska, 1975). As Walcott demonstrates, another element often considered is the adult's right to assert parental ties with their
children. Some writers have criticized the consideration of parental rights
in determining a child's best interests, suggesting instead that the total emphasis be the consideration of the child's situation and developmental
needs. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS
OF THE CHILD 106 (1973).
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Court affirmed. 35 This deviated from the traditional approach
which would have considered parental fitness determinative.
The court ruled that the substantive rights of the unwed father
were not violated by the application of the "best interest of the
child" standard, without the fitness of the father being deter36
mined.
This ruling was affirmed by a unanimous United States
Supreme Court on appeal. 37 The Court first ruled that the unwed father's due process rights were not violated by the application of the "best interests of the child" standard. Justice
Marshall's opinion 38 noted that Quilloin did not seek custody of
the child and that the adoption would not place the child with a
new set of parents; Georgia was recognizing a family, not dissolving one.3 9 Therefore, the state was not required under the
United States Constitution to decide anything other than what
was best for the child before it decreed the adoption, and thus,
terminated the unwed father's parental rights. In reaching this
decision, Justice Marshall elaborated on the equal protection
35. 238 Ga. 230, 232 S.E.2d 246 (1977).
36. See note 34 supra. The Georgia court also ruled that the strong state
policy of rearing children in a family setting was a rational and valid basis
for the illegitimacy classification in the Georgia statutes. In the event the
unwed mother consented to the adoption of her child, the Georgia court did
not think that giving an unwed father a veto power which could be used to
thwart the child's placement into a healthy family situation was consistent
with the declared public policy. 238 Ga. at 232, 232 S.E.2d at 248. In its use of
the "rational basis" test, the Georgia court stated that fourteenth amendment equal protection "does not prevent classification if the distinction is
based on valid state interests." 238 Ga. at 232, 232 S.E.2d at 248. In adopting
"rational basis" as the standard, the Georgia court was implicitly rejecting
the contention that Stanley v. Illinois had designated an unwed father's parental interests as "fundamental," the infringement of which could only be
sustained by a "compelling state interest." See note 25 supra. The Georgia

dissent adopted the broad interpretation of Stanley and argued that the
Georgia statutory scheme was unconstitutional because it did not give an

unwed father the same rights as parents in adoption proceedings. 238 Ga. at
235, 232 S.E.2d at 249. For an idea of just how differently the Georgia courts

treated legitimate and illegitimate fathers, compare Walcott with Wheeler

v. Little, 113 Ga. App. 106, 147 S.E.2d 352 (1966). See also Note, Consent of
"Unfit" ParentsNeeded for Adoption-Unless Their Rights are Terminated,
28 MERCER L. REV. 553 (1977).

37. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
38. Note that Justice Marshall had joined the majority opinion in Stanley v. Illinois. Thus, the Walcott opinion probably represents the interpretation of Stanley which its majority intended.
39. 434 U.S. at 255. The Court acknowledged that there is little doubt

that the due process clause would be violated "[i]f a State were to attempt
to force the breakup of a natural family, over the objections of the parents
and their children, without some showing of unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so was thought to be in the children's best interest." Id. at 255
(quoting Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862-63)
(1977) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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problem that Stanley pointed out, since Quilloin relied on it to
preserve his rights.
Quilloin argued that under the equal protection clause he
should be accorded the same power to veto the adoption that the
40
state granted to parents, regardless of the fact of illegitimacy.
The Court rejected this argument because Quilloin "never exercised actual or legal custody over his child." From this fact, the
Court presumed that the unwed father "never shouldered any
significant responsibility with respect to the daily supervision,
education, protection, or care of the child."'4 1 Thus, the Court
concluded that the unwed father's rights were distinguishable
from those of parents and Georgia could deny him veto authority after the hearing without violating the equal protection
42
clause.
The essence of the holdings in both Stanley and Walcott is
the requirement that the unwed father be afforded procedural
due process. 43 The cases do not mandate exact equal protection
of the wed and unwed merely because of the biological relationship between parent and child. However, illegitimacy cannot be
used as a label through which parental unfitness is conclusively
presumed. The unwed father must be given the opportunity to
prove that he is a de facto parent before his legal relationship
with the child can be terminated. If the unwed father has not
undertaken a de facto parental role, the state can modify and
terminate all the legal rights of the unwed father. For an example of the application of this rule one only need compare Stanley
and Walcott.
40. 434 U.S. at 256. In particular, the appellant argued that his interests
were indistinguishable from those of a divorced or separated father living
apart from his children.

41. Id. In contrast, the Court said even a divorced father "will have
borne full responsibility for the rearing of his children during the period of
the marriage." Id. At this point, the Court seemingly forgets that a father
may obtain a divorce before his child is born and may never live with his
child. Thus, for at least this type of divorced father, the Court's distinction
between wed and unwed fathers, based on child-rearing, fails.
42. Id. In summing up its ruling on equal protection, the Court said
"[uInder any standard of review, the State was not foreclosed from recognizing this difference in the extent of commitment to the welfare of the
child." Id. (emphasis added). Perhaps to preserve an otherwise unanimous opinion, the Court was avoiding the issue of whether rational basis or
compelling state interest should be the test of equal protection. However,
the Walcott decision lends support for the use of the rational basis test
through its affirmation of the Georgia decision which used rational basis in
upholding the state statute. See note 36 supra. Thus, the interest which
accrues to an unwed father by way of mere biological relation may not be
regarded as fundamental. See note 25 supra.
43. See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
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Stanley and Walcott.: A Comparison
Stanley and Walcott furnish the case law from which an unwed father's parental rights emanate. A comparison of these
two cases is, therefore, a necessary step preceding any examination of state procedures involving unwed fathers in adoption
proceedings. The unanimous Walcott decision is a sharp departure from what many commentators expected in light of
Stanley. However, after taking note of factual and procedural
distinctions between the cases and keeping in mind the narrow
interpretation of Stanley, it will become apparent that the cases
are consistent and complementary.
First, the family settings must be considered. Peter Stanley
had maintained a de facto parental relationship with his children, but Leon Quilloin never lived with and never wanted to
live with his child. Also, in Walcott, the mother raised the child
and consented to the adoption. In contrast, the mother in
44
Stanley died, leaving Peter Stanley to raise the children.
Thus, Stanley occupied the role of parent because he was raising his children and, therefore, was in a stronger position to assert his parental rights than Quilloin.
Second, one must consider the judicial proceedings from
which these two cases arose. Stanley was a guardianship action, after which the family was dissolved. The central inquiry
should have been whether the father was unfit. Instead, the father was conclusively presumed unfit as a matter of law after
the state proved that the children were illegitimate. In contrast,
Walcott was a consolidated adoption/legitimacy hearing. There
the test was whether the adoption was in the best interest of the
child. This issue was addressed in a hearing in which the father
was permitted to present evidence to support his claims on all
"relevant issues." 45 Thus, Stanley and Walcott are distinguishable in regard to the test applied and the manner in which the
46
hearings were conducted.
44. The traditional importance of the unwed mother, as opposed to the
father is the basis for disparity of parental rights as set forth in many statutory setups. See e.g. note 29 supra. This point was noted by the Georgia
court, 238 Ga. at 253, 232 S.E.2d at 249, where it was a sufficient basis to
distinguish this result from Stanley.
45. See note 34 and accompanying text supra.
46. The consolidated Georgia procedure avoided the "procedure by presumption" proscribed in Stanley. See United States Dep't of Agriculture V.
Murry, 413 U.S. 508, 517-18 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Mar-

shall said:
[WIe must decide whether, considering the private interest affected

and the governmental interest sought to be advanced, a hearing must

be provied to one who claims that the application of some general provision of the law aimed at certain abuses will not in fact lower the inci-
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Third, one must consider the traditional state policy favoring the raising of children in a family setting.47 In Stanley, the
decision prevented the children from being removed from the
custody of their father who helped raise them. This avoided destroying an existing family. The Court reasoned that the state's
interest in removing the children from the "de facto family" was
de minimis and did not justify the presumption of unfitness
drawn only from the fact of illegitimacy. 48 In Walcott, the adoption further solidified a family composed of the illegitimate, his
mother and her husband. The unwed father was not a de facto
parent. Therefore, the state's interest in confirming the existing
family relationship was paramount because it was in the best
interest of the child. Since both decisions provided a family setting consistent with the demands of state policy, the decisions
are consistent.
Finally, one must consider the element of overriding concern-the best interest of the child. Both cases indicate that if
the father is a de facto parent, regardless of the legitimacy of the
child, it is in the child's best interest for the father to retain his
parental rights. In Stanley, the Court refused to presume the father unfit, and by leaving the children with him the Court was
attempting to prevent a potentially disturbing relocation of the
children.4 9 In Walcott, the father was excluded from the family
relationship when the trial court found that it would not be in
the best interest of the child to be removed from its mother and
her husband. 50 The trial court also terminated the father's visitadence of those abuses but will instead needlessly harm him. .

.

. In

short, where the private interests affected are very important and the
governmental interest can be promoted without much difficulty by a
well-designed hearing procedure, the Due Process Clause requires the
Government to act on an individualized basis, with general propositions
serving only as rebuttable presumptions or other burden-shifting

defices. That, I think, is the import of Stanley v. Illinois.
Id. (citations omitted).

47. See note 36 supra.
48. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657-58 (1972).
49. See generally Comment, Disposition of the Illegitimate

Child-Father'sRight to Notice, 1968 U. ILL. L.F. 232, for a discussion of how
children are disturbed by relocation.
50. Even if Leon Quilloin had successfully prevented the adoption, it is
unlikely that he would have been granted custody of Darrell. Before Stanley v. Illinois, it was almost universally accepted that an unwed mother had
superior rights to the custody of the child. See Annot., 45 A.L.R.3d 216, 22324 (1972). The post Stanley cases have come to mixed results. Compare In
re Brenda H., 37 Ohio Misc. 123, 305 N.E.2d 815 (1973) (giving mother custody preference) with Vanderlaan v. Vanderlaan, 9 Ill. App. 2d 260, 292
N.E.2d 145 (1973) (no custody preference to mother). When one of the parents has maintained custody of the child since birth, it has been urged that
changing the abode of the young child is not in his or her best interest. See
J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, A. SOLNrr, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
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tion rights because his prior visits "disturbed the child."5 ' Thus,
the decision in both cases confirm the family situations the
Court felt would be in the child's best interest.
After Stanley and Walcott
In the aftermath of Stanley and Walcott, the nature of the
legitimacy hearing may change. The legitimacy petition cannot
be considered in the summary proceeding that was formerly utilized. Also, the hearing may be consolidated with the hearing on
the adoption proceeding. Most important, the states must provide at least an opportunity for the unwed father to be heard on
all issues that affect his legal rights to his illegitimate child. The
father can preserve his rights by showing that he is a de facto
parent. To prove de facto parent status, the father must show
that he has provided daily supervision, education, and protection for the child. In addition, he may have to prove that removing the child from his custody would break up a de facto family.
If the father is successful, the state must accord him all the
rights accorded parents of legitimates; otherwise, the state may
bar the father from interfering with the placement of the child.
While this approach seems reasonable and appropriate after
considering state policy favoring preservation of the family, it is
a departure from the traditional dogmatic approach to illegitimacy. Traditionally, the label of illegitimacy provided a convenient means for states to summarily preclude any participation
of the unwed father in the legal affairs of his illegitimate child.
However, once the child was legitimized, all the legal disabilities
were removed and the unwed father was placed on a par with
parents of legitimate children. The new approach rejects this
traditional dogmatic attitude and requires the states to view the
problem of illegitimacy through the eye of reality. The unwed
father can no longer be conclusively presumed unfit or disregarded by definition. He must at least be afforded the opportunity to prove that he is a de facto parent and therefore, entitled
to the same procedural protections afforded parents of legitimate children.
Even though the Supreme Court has required the states to
provide procedural protection for unwed fathers, some jurisdictions do not require that all unwed fathers be notified of pending
CHILD 31-34 (1973). Thus, it is unlikely here that a denial of the adoption
would have resulted in relocation of the child. However, the denial would
have kept the Walcott family from being further solidified, "a result desired
by all, except the appellant." 434 U.S. at 255.
51. Once a child is adopted, it is likely that the natural parent's visitation rights will be terminated. See H. CLARK, DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 18.1
(1968).
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actions. The Court did not resolve the question of whether all
unwed fathers are entitled to notice of pending adoption proceedings, because the issue was not raised by either party in
Walcott or Stanley. However, in a footnote, the Stanley Court
suggested that all unwed fathers have a right to notice of any
52
proceeding which could result in termination of their rights.
This approach seems logical for without notice the unwed father
would be unable to protect his rights in a hearing before his
rights were terminated. This logic led commentators to conclude that a decree terminating the rights of an unwed father
and effecting an adoption would be voidable if the unwed father
was not notified.5 3 Thus, to insure the validity of adoption procedures, some states have undertaken the total obligation to notify
theunwed father.54 In contrast, some argued that the unwed father still had the initial burden of making his interest in the
child clear before notice is given.5 5 Walcott reinforces this by
holding that not all unwed parents are entitled to all parental
rights; only de facto parents must be afforded full parental
rights.5 6 This suggests that only de facto parents must be notified. It may also suggest that the unwed father must initiate the
hearing to protect his interest. Regardless of which approach is
adopted, by upholding the Georgia statutes, the Court implies
that administrative convenience and delay avoidance may be a
rational basis for notifying only de facto parents since it will fa52. 405 U.S. 645, 657 n.9 (1972). The Court said:
Extending opportunity for hearing to unwed fathers who desire and
claim competence to care for their children creates no constitutional or
procedural obstacle to foreclosing those unwed fathers who are not so
inclined. The Illinois law ... provides for personal service, notice by
certified mail, or for notice by publication when personal or certified
mail service cannot be had or when notice is directed to unknown respondents under the style of "All whom it may Concern." Unwed fathers who do not promptly respond cannot complain if their children
are declared wards of the state.
53. See Barron, supra note 22, at 529.
54. See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 40, § 1509 (1977).
55. See Freeman, supra note 19, at 396. The crux of this position is that
in all of the early cases, the unwed father himself initiated the proceeding.
56. Walcott also gives rise to a contrary argument for giving notice to all
unwed fathers. This comes from the Walcott Court's response to an argument by the Walcotts that the unwed father waived his constitutional interests in the child by not legitimizing him before the adoption. The Court
responded, saying: "We would hesitate to rest decision on this ground, in
light of the evidence in the record that appellant was not aware of the legitimation procedure until after the adoption petition was filed." 434 U.S. at
254. This indicates that the Court may not have approved of a state procedure whereby notice is not provided on the grounds of lack of parental interest. In the above quote, the Court was dealing with the unwed father's
ignorance of the law. An even more compelling situation for notice under
this logic would be ignorance of the existence of the child. Thus, this may
be a suggestion by the Court that all unwed fathers must be notified.
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cilitate placement of children into permanent homes.
With the issues of hearing, procedure, and notice more fully
defined, we have a better idea of the protections which a state
must afford the interests of an unwed father. With these more
definitive standards in mind, the next step is an examination of
exemplary state reactions to Stanley v. Illinois.

EXEMPLARY RESPONSES TO STANLEY:

An Examination After WALCOTT
Illinois: The Sweeping Interpretationof Stanley
One month after Stanley was decided, the Illinois Supreme
Court ruled that provisions of the Illinois Adoption and Paternity Statutes were unconstitutional. 58 The Illinois Court
adopted the sweeping equal protection interpretation of Stanley
rejecting the distinctions between unwed fathers and all others
based on illegitimacy.5 9 Now, the court was requiring the consent of both mother and unwed father for the adoption of the
illegitimate child unless first declared to be unfit parents. The
Illinois Attorney General concurred in this approach. 60
The Illinois legislature codified this sweeping interpretation
by enacting legislation affording broad protections for the rights
and interests of the unwed father. First, the statutory definition
was amended to include all unwed fathers. 61 Also, the adoption
provision which had previously said that consent was unnecessary62 was amended to require the consent of the unwed father.63 Now, Illinois must either get the consent of the unwed
father or terminate his parental rights through a neglect proceeding. In addition, a notice provision has been added to the
Adoption Act. 64 This section requires that the unwed father be
notified of the pending adoption and informed of his rights.
Such notice is given after an "interested party" requests it in
writing. Service may be by person or certified mail.65 To preserve his rights under the Act the unwed father must file a dec57. See note 42 supra.
58. Slawek v. Covenant Children's Home, 52 Ill. 2d 20, 284 N.E.2d 291
(1972). The Illinois Adoption Act precluded the father from asserting any
rights in the adoption proceeding. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 4, §§ 9.1-1, 9.1-8 (1971).
59. 52 Ill. 2d at 22, 284 N.E.2d at 292.
60. 1972 Op. AT-r'y GEN. 140 (1972).
61. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 1501E (1977) states, "Parent means the father or mother of a legitimate or illegitimate child."
62. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-8(e) (1971) (amended and recodified at ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 1510(a) (1977)).

63. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 1510(a) (1977).
64. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 1515 (1977).
65. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 1515(1) (1977). "Interested Parties" include
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laration of paternity within thirty days. If the whereabouts of
the unwed father is unknown, the Act provides for the
mandatory use of notice by publication. 66 This notice does not
contain the name of the mother. 67 If an unwed father does not
respond within thirty68 days, his rights in the child are terminated
by operation of law.
These measures, criticized by commentators as being "an
overreaction ' 69 and "flawed and imprecise,' 70 nonetheless
seemed to be a way to comply with a sweeping interpretation of
Stanley. In the wake of Walcott, however, it is now safe to say
that Illinois went beyond what the Supreme Court required in
Stanley. Walcott demonstrates that the unwed father does not
have to be given full parental rights prior to a hearing to determine whether he is a de facto parent. Illinois has given full parental rights to unwed fathers who may have no protectable
interests in the child without the constraint of the hearing.
This overbroad approach leads to unnecessary obstacles
and potential delays in the adoption process. Now, to vitiate the
unwed father's rights, the state must prove by clear and convincing evidence that he is unfit.7 1 If the unwed father is not a "de
facto" parent, 72 as defined by the Supreme Court in Walcott, the
time consuming and sometimes unsuccessful termination procedures could be avoided. 73 Thus, Illinois could remove consent
and termination obstacles from the adoption process by amending the statutes to protect only de facto parents as defined in
Walcott.
The present Illinois procedure cannot be criticized for prescribing notice to all unwed fathers. As noted earlier, the notice
the natural mother, the person intending to adopt the child, a child welfare
agency, or an attorney representing a party.
66. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 1509 (1977).

67. Id.
68. ILL. REV.

STAT. ch. 40, § 1515 (1977), provides:
In the event the putative father does not file a declaration of paternity of the child or request for notice within 30 days of service of the
above notice, he need not be made a party to or given notice of any
proceeding brought for the adoption of the child. An Order or Decree
may be entered in such proceeding terminating all of his rights with
respect to said child without further notice to him.
69. See Barron, supra note 22 at 529 n.4.
70. See Freeman, supra note 19 at 398-99.
71. In Interest of Love, 50 Ill. App. 3d 1018, 366 N.E.2d 139 (1977). This
must always be proven in the absence of consent. See note 15 supra.
72. See text accompanying note 41 supra.
73. See, e.g., In re Cech, 8 Ill. App. 3d 642, 291 N.E.2d (1972). For an analysis of Illinois cases dealing with termination of parental rights, See Comment, New Adoption Proceedings in Illinois, 7 J. MAR. J. 194, 203-06 (1973).

The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure [Vol. 12:383

398

question is still open to debate after Walcott.7 4 Aside from constitutional considerations, however, the Illinois notice by publication provision 75 has been criticized as being ineffective. 76 The
thrust of this criticism is that the unwed father, who is unaware
of his paternity, will not know the child in question is his because the mother's name is not in the notice. 77 If this criticism
is valid, the notification by publication is not always fulfilling its
intended purpose. In the absence of a clear constitutional mandate, Illinois would have justification in discontinuing notice by
publication in cases where the facts indicate it will be unsuccessful. A discretionary use of this type of notice would reduce
the expense and delays resulting from its use in low percentage
situations.
New York: Restricted Interpretationof Stanley
When Stanley was decided, New York had statutes similar
to Illinois; only the consent of the mother was required in the
adoption of an illegitimate child.78 An unwed father was not
even entitled to notice of the adoption proceeding. 79 After
Stanley, the New York courts were forced to re-evaluate their
statutes.
The first case dealing with this issue was Doe v. Department
of Social Services8° which was decided five months after
Stanley. The New York trial court recognized that an unwed
father has substantial interests in his child, and therefore, must
be given notice of impending actions which may terminate his
rights even though a delay may result. The statute in issue was
read to mean the mother's consent suffices "only where there
has been no formal or unequivocal acknowledgement or recognition of paternity by the father. '8 1 An unwed father was given
status to contest an adoption of his child, but was not given a
82
veto power over the adoption.
The New York Court of Appeals first dealt with a Stanley
constitutional challenge in In re Malpica-Orsini.83 The issue
74. See text accompanying notes 52-57 supra.
75. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 1509 (1977).
76. See Freeman, supra note 19, at 397.
77. Id.

78. N.Y. [DoM. REL.] LAW § 111(1)(c)(McKinney Supp. 1978) provides
that consent is required "of the mother, whether adult or infant, of a child
born out of wedlock."
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

See Doe v. Roe, 37 App. Div. 2d 433, 326 N.Y.S.2d 421 (1971).
71 Misc. 2d 666, 337 N.Y.S.2d 102 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
Id. at 671, 337 N.Y.S.2d at 107.
Id.
36 N.Y.2d 568, 331 N.E.2d 486, 370 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1975).
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again concerned the unwed father's right to stop the adoption.
The unwed father in this case had lived with the mother and his
child until the child was eighteen months old. After the mother
and father separated, the mother initiated an action for child
support. The unwed father admitted paternity, was ordered to
make support payments, and received visitation rights.
After the mother married, the new stepfather filed an adoption petition. The unwed father was permitted to contest the
adoption in the hearing but was not given a right to veto the
adoption, and was not declared an unfit parent. The Westchester family court merely ruled that the adoption was in the child's
best interests and decreed the adoption. The unwed father appealed, claiming that this procedure denied him equal protection, as set forth in Stanley.
The court of appeals affirmed, and upheld the constitutionality of the statute. The court thought Stanley was decided on
due process grounds and limited to the facts of the case. In contrast to Stanley the unwed father in Orsini had been given notice and a hearing to contest the adoption by court direction.
Thus, while Peter Stanley had been denied due process in not
receiving a hearing on his parental fitness, the court felt that due
process was satisfied in this case since a hearing was provided.
The court felt that a classification which denies an unwed
father a veto power was supported by a valid state interest,
whereas in Stanley there was no rational basis for denying the
unwed father a hearing.84 Requiring consent of unwed fathers
would delay and sometimes deny a child the blessings of adoption,85 and giving such a veto power would allow some unwed
fathers an opportunity to extort payoffs in return for their consent.8 6 With these considerations providing a "rational basis,"
the court held that the New York adoption statute did not vio87
late the equal protection clause.
It appears that the approach which New York took was partially correct when examined in light of Walcott. Orsini was correct in its conclusion that Stanley did not require legal equality
84. The New York majority's use of a rational basis test was criticized
by the dissent which argued that Stanley had made an unwed father's parental interest "fundamental" and that a compelling state interest was required to uphold the statutory distinction. 36 N.Y.2d at 582, 331 N.E.2d at
498, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 524 (Jones, J., dissenting). However, Walcott suggests
that the Orsini majority was correct. See note 42 supra.
85. 36 N.Y.2d at 572, 331 N.E.2d at 489, 370 N.Y.S. 2d at 516.
86. Id.
87. For commentary critical of the Orsini decision, see Note, Constitutional Lau-Statute PermittingAdoption of Illegitimate Child Without Father's Consent is not Violation of Equal Protection, 44 FORD. L. REV. 646
(1975).
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of wed and unwed fathers. However, it would seem that New
York was incorrect in refusing parental rights to those de facto
parents described in Walcott. 8s If Orsini were decided today, an
application of the Walcott standard might dictate a contrary result 89 since the unwed father had helped raise the child until the
child was eighteen months old. This may have been a sufficient
shouldering of parental responsibility to entitle the unwed father to the same parental rights as a legitimate father. To correct this deficiency, the New York courts would only have to
extend the father's rights which had been first read into the statute in Doe v. Department of Social Services.90
New York has not assumed an obligation to notify all unwed
fathers of their child's impending adoption proceeding. Unlike
Illinois, New York's statute 9' does not require notice to all unwed fathers. Instead, the statute sets forth seven classes of unwed fathers who are to receive notice.9 2 Most of these
classifications are based on a solid connection with the child, ei88. 434 U.S. at 255.
89. The Supreme Court is now considering a case testing the constitutionality of the New York Statute; Caban v. Mohammed, No. 77-6431 (filed
Mar. 27, 1978) forma pauperis granted and probable jurisdiction noted May
15, 1978. Oral arguments were heard on November 6, 1978. As in Walcott,
the unwed father is seeking to block the adoption of his child by the natural
mother and her husband. The New York Surrogate Court granted the petition of adoption over the objections of the unwed father; the New York
Court of Appeals affirmed. 43 N.Y.2d 708, 401 N.Y.S. 2d 208 (1978). Aside
from the question of the illegitimacy classification, the unwed father also
argues that the disparate New York treatment of unwed fathers and
mothers creates an unconstitutional classification based on sex.
90. 71 Misc. 2d 666, 337 N.Y.S.2d 102 (Sup. Ct. 1972). See text accompanying note 81 supra.
91. N.Y. [DoM. REL.] LAw § 111-a (McKinney Supp. 1978).
92. Id. § 111-a(2) provides:
Persons entitled to notice, pursuant to subdivision one of this section, shall include:
(a) any person adjudicated by a court in this state to be the father
of the child;
(b) any person adjudicated by a court of another state or territory
of the United States to be the father of the child, when a certified copy
of the court order has been filed with the putative father registry, pursuant to section three hundred seventy-two-c of the social services law;
(c) any person who has timely filed an unrevoked notice of intent
to claim paternity of the child, pursuant to section three hundred seventy-two-c of the social services law;
(d) any person who is recorded on the child's birth certificate as
the child's father;
(e) any person who is openly living with the child or the child's
mother at the time the proceeding is initiated and who is holding himself out to be the child's father;
(f) any person who has been identified as the child's father by the
mother in written, sworn statement; and
(g) any person who was married to the child's mother subsequent
to the birth of the child.
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ther by law, by actual relationship, or by way of the mother. 93
The statute provides for service by registered or certified mail,
but, unlike Illinois, the statute expressly states that service by
publication is not necessary. 94 Whether this notice procedure
satisfies all due process requirements is unclear after Stanley
and Walcott. The limited notice obligation is, however, a consis9 5
tent outgrowth of the due process interpretation of Stanley.
In light of the recent Walcott decision, it would seem that
the New York courts were essentially correct in their restricted
interpretation of Stanley. By judicial incorporation of the
Walcott standards into already existing statutes, New York can
afford necessary constitutional protections to the interests of
unwed fathers without amending the statutes. This is a sharp
contrast to Illinois where after Walcott, the state's response to
Stanley can now be seen as an overreaction.
Uniform ParentageAct. Model Response to Stanley
In the summer of 1973, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws adopted the Uniform Parentage
Act (U.P.A.). The purpose of the U.P.A. was to offer a model legislative response to Stanley and its progeny .96 Among the problem areas which the U.P.A. deals with are adoption and custody
of illegitimate children. These problem areas were characterized by Professor Krause as difficult and uncertain in the wake
of Stanley.97 The suggested legislative response to the adoption
and custody problem is embodied in section 24 of the U.P.A., entitled CustodialProceedings.98 Professor Krause has stated that
93. Note that there is the class of unwed fathers whom the mother fails
to identify under § 111-a(2)(f). In many cases, the mother may want to
avoid involvement by the father and refuse to identify him for purpose of

notice.
94. N.Y. [DoM. RELI- LAw § 111-a(4) (McKinney Supp. 1978).

95. See text accompanying notes 55-57 supra. The weakest aspect of the
New York notice statute may be the absence of any use of notice by publication. Without the use of publication, unwed fathers falling within one of
the seven categories of the statute could still very well fail to get notice
when their whereabouts are unknown. To justify the failure to use publication in such a case, the state could only cite administrative convenience. In
a case where the equities are heavily in favor of the father this might be
held to be a violation of due process. The discretionary use of notice by
publication in instances where the chances of success are good would
strengthen the statute against such an attack.
96. Krause, The Uniform ParentageAct, 8 FAM. L.Q. 1 (1974)

[hereinaf-

ter cited as Krause I. Professor Krause served as reporter-draftsman of the
Committee on a Uniform Parentage Act of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
97. Id. at 7. Krause characterized the Stanley decision as "imprecise."
98. Id. at 23. The full text of the U.P.A. is included with Professor
Krause's article.
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the committee intended to conform to a reasonable interpretation of Stanley and at the same time, provide an efficient procedure by which interference and delay in the adoption procedure
99
is kept at a minimum.
Under the U.P.A., when a child is put up for adoption, a man
whose paternity has been determined in a court action, or is a
"presumed father," must be afforded notice and full parental
rights. 10 0 A man will be presumed a parent if he receives a child
into his home and holds the child out as his natural child or if he
acknowledges paternity in a writing filed with a court. 10 1 A man
10 2
who has been identified as the child's father must be notified.
If he appears at the hearing, the court must determine his custodial rights. 10 3 If he does not appear, his parental rights in the
child are terminated by operation of law.' 0 4 If no father is identified the court shall enter an order terminating the unknown
father's parental rights. 0 5 Such an order becomes "incontes10 6
tible," but may be appealed within six months.
The notice section of the U.P.A. provides that the state use
its usual rules of service. 10 7 In the event the natural father is not
identified, notice by publication may be used when the court de10 8
termines it is appropriate and likely to lead to identification.
99. Id. at 14.
§ 24(a) provides:
If a mother relinquishes or proposes to relinquish for adoption a child
who has (1) a presumed father under Section 4(a), (2) a father whose
relationship to the child has been determined by a court, or (3) a father
as to whom the child is a legitimate child under prior law of this state or
under the law of another jurisdiction, the father shall be given notice of
the adoption proceeding and have the rights provided under [the appropriate State statute] [the Revised Uniform Adoption Act], unless the
father's relationship to the child has been previously terminated or determined by a court riot to exist.
101. UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT § 4(a). Four of the five classifications of
presumptive parent are roughly equivalent to the "de facto parent" as defined in Walcott. The fifth class of fathers, who have acknowledged their
paternity in writing, includes fathers who have not lived with or helped
raise their children.
102. UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT § 24(c).provides for measures to identify a
child's father. "[Tihe court shall cause inquiry to be made of the mother
and any other appropriate person." Under § 10(B) of the act, the court can
compel the testimony of any witness. Thus, reading these sections together, the court can compel the mother to identify the father. There is
some question as to whether this infringes on the mother's constitutional
rights to privacy. See Barron, supra note 22, at 537-41. See also Krause,
supra note 96, at 8.
103. UNIFORM PARENTAGE AcT § 24(d) (1973).
104. Id.
105. UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT § 25(e) (1973).
106. Id.
107. UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT § 27(f)(1973).
108. Id.
100. UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT
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Professor Krause has indicated that embarrassment to the
mother is one circumstance for a court to weigh in deciding
whether to use notice by publication. 10 9
After this examination of the rights conferred upon unwed
fathers by the U.P.A. and the rights required after Walcott, it is
evident that the U.P.A. goes further than what is constitutionally
necessary. The fully priviledged class of fathers who had "received a child into [their] home and openly [held it] out as
[theirs]" seems equivalent to the de facto father in
Walcott-the father who exercises legal custody over his children or "shoulderls] significant responsibility with respect to
daily supervision." However, by allowing parental rights to any
identified father who responds to the notice, the U.P.A. gives full
parental rights to more unwed fathers than required by Walcott.
Clearly, not all the fathers who respond to the notice and appear
at the hearing will have actually reared the child. Leon Quilloin
is one such example. Thus, like Illinois, the U.P.A. went further
in equalizing the rights of wed and unwed fathers than is necessary.
Although the U.P.A. overreacted somewhat to Stanley, it did
not go as far as Illinois. Illinois gives full parental rights to all
unwed fathers who request notice of later proceedings. 110 The
U.P.A. gives full parental rights to only those fathers who appear
at the hearing and demand custody rights. Thus the U.P.A. will
be conferring full parental privileges on a more restricted group
of interested fathers. This requirement of actual custodial interest in a child may prevent spiteful misuse of parental rights.11
While the exact notice requirement remains undefined after
Stanley and Walcott, it would seem safe to assume that the
U.P.A. provides an adequate notice procedure. In comparison
with the Illinois procedure, the notice by publication as provided by U.P.A. would seem more efficient and effective than
that of Illinois. By making the use of notice by publication discretionary with the court, the U.P.A. avoids the use of this procedure in a situation where it is unlikely to succeed. In contrast,
Illinois' mandatory use of notice by publication will not avoid
109. Krause, supra note 96, at 15-16.
110. See note 68 and accompanying text supra.
111. Recognizing the difficulty of finding parental unfitness under some
of the traditional grounds of unfitness, Illinois enacted ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40,
§ 1501D(l) (1977) which provides that "[flailure to demonstrate a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the welfare of a new-

born child during the first 30 days after its birth" is a ground for an
adjudication of parental unfitness and termination of parental rights. This
clause should be effective at least against those fathers who knew of the
illegitimate child's birth. However, it may be of questionable application to
those fathers who were unaware of their paternity. See note 56 supra.
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those situations where success is unlikely. Since the fact situation in such cases can be very diverse, leaving the use of publication within the discretion of the court may be an appropriate
solution.
CONCLUSION

A state can comply with the constitutional standards of due
process and equal protection without incurring significant interference and delay with its adoption process. The analysis of the
three legislative responses to Stanley illustrates some measures
which are necessary or expedient and those which seem unnecessary and can cause delays in an adoption procedure.
One measure to avoid is the statutory inclusion of all unwed
fathers into the class of parents deserving the right to consent
over the adoption. Only those fathers who have actually helped
raise the child and who have an actual parental relation must be
afforded equal parental rights. The best measure would reject a
dogmatic approach and allow courts discretion to apply the
Walcott standard to the particular facts of each case. The procedure of adjudicating parental rights on an ad hoc basis, utilized
in New York and to some extent in the U.P.A., avoids the need to
terminate the parental rights of an unwed father who is not a de
facto parent.
Still unresolved after Stanley and Walcott is the problem of
notice. One procedure which merits serious consideration is the
U.P.A.'s use of discretionary notice by publication. This procedure seems to promise efficiency while being, at the same time,
constitutionally sound.
One clearly desirable measure is the U.P.A. procedure for
terminating the rights of unknown or disinterested fathers
which is both efficient and equitable. If the father is not interested enough in the child's welfare to appear at the hearing and
demand custody, his rights are summarily terminated. By having the statute prescribe this termination the burdensome process of proving the father unfit under one of the general unfitness
classifications is avoided.
The main determining factor in defining an unwed father's
parental rights should be the best interests of the child. "Best
interests of the child" seemingly was of overriding importance
in Walcott. The Walcott Court sustained an application of the
"best interests of the child" standard as providing due process.
"Best interest of the child" was the thrust of Georgia's public
policy argument which the Supreme Court found to sustain the
illegitimacy classification against the equal protection attacks.
It is quite possible that it was an overriding concern for the wel-
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fare of the child which brought the Supreme Court to hand
down an unanimous decision. Finally, it is the probable difference in the extent of commitment to a child's welfare which distinguishes fathers who have raised their children from those
who have not. This is really the underlying consideration derived from an analysis of Stanley and Walcott.
Therefore, the best interests of the child should be the focal
point of analysis in determining the rights of unwed fathers. A
statutory procedure which provides for an ad hoc determination
of the child's best interests throughout the diversified fact situations which inevitably arise, is constitutionally and socially
sound.
Steven E. Davis

